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chapter six

The Uncertainty
Relations: Paradigm or
Ontology of Nature?

Is it possible to infer which of the elements of Heisenberg’s interpretation he held
to belong to the basic descriptive ontology of quantum mechanics and which
formed merely a part of a proposed paradigm? According to his own account,1
it was not until some months after the paper on the Uncertainty Relations was
written, that he abandoned the belief that the old classical descriptive concepts
were inadequate for quantum physics. I surmise then, that in that 1927 paper
classical visualizable pictures of quantum phenomena were intended to belong
merely to the paradigm and not to the underlying ontology. I conclude then that
the underlying descriptive ontology was still controlled by the abstract principle of
E (instein)-observability, Heisenberg started out with.
The most important interpretative contribution of this paper is its attempt
to explain what is to be understood by the new non-classical quantum mechanical kinematical variables of place, velocity, trajectory, etc. As in the relativistic
paradigm, there is a syntactic aspect (of the mathematical model) which escapes
sensible intuition and a semantical aspect which reinterprets the variables as con
stituting an appropriate set of observables. This involves condition Hv of the relativistic model, so far unexploited by Heisenberg. He included reference to an
observer (interpreted here as including the measuring instrument) as part of the
1

AHQP, Heisenberg-Kuhn, 27 February 1963.
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re-interpreted definition of the variable, and in so far, an epistemological part of
the variable as described, as in the case of relativistic space-time. For instance,
in his discussion of place, Heisenberg writes: “The concept of place necessarily
involves reference to a way of measuring position relative to a frame of reference:
otherwise the term has no sense.”2
In the relativistic re-interpretation, the reference was a purely logical one, not
taking into account the possible effects of a physical interaction between the object
and the observer, an interaction that might possibly affect both. Heisenberg makes
clear that in the case of quantum mechanics such an interaction is presumed and
enters substantially into what quantum mechanics is all about. A variable is, by
definition, an intelligible function of the appropriate measuring process. But, he
points out, individual measurements are discrete processes which bind instrument
and object through a shared and indivisible photon. In the case of position measurements, these discrete indivisible processes represent no more than a series of
discrete locations spaced in time which do not constitute a continuous trajectory. If
neighboring locations are joined by straight line segments, neighboring segments
have discontinuous slopes on a position-time graph. The discontinuity in slope
then measures the velocity (and momentum) uncertainty of the particle.
The new “place” variable is understood as the old intuitively grounded “objectifiable” variable but re-interpreted so as to make it relative to an instrument within
the process of a measurement. He then makes the surprising claim: “All the concepts that are used in the classical theory for the description of a mechanical system can also be defined exactly for atomic processes.”3 It is clear from the context,
however, that what Heisenberg intends to say is that the classical and quantum
mechanical concepts have the same “operational definitions,” in other words: the
same measuring devices and procedures that are effective in measuring one are
also effective in measuring the other. Measurement devices and procedures in the
“operational” sense are described in the pre-theoretical language LP and do not
employ the implicitly defined relationships of the theory which would be taken
to define a variable in the strict sense of the term. The same pre-theoretically
described measurement procedures, he says, can be used to measure classical position and quantum mechanical position.
There is a quantum mechanical limitation, moreover, to the simultaneous
observation of canonically conjugate quantities, such as position and momentum:
“the experiments which lead to such definitions carry with them an uncertainty

2
3

Heisenberg (1927c) op. cit., 174.
Ibid., 179.

the u n c e r ta i n t y r e lati o n s

| 49

if they involve the simultaneous determination of two canonically conjugate
quantities.”4
Finally, since a quantum mechanical variable is an intelligible function of a
measuring process, it is not clear whether the new position variable has observable
instances apart from instances that are actually observed—an ambiguity due to
Heisenberg’s practice of using “observing” and “measuring” as synonymous terms.
Heisenberg tries to explain the simultaneous uncertainty in position and
momentum by examples. It is not clear whether the purpose of these examples is
to explore the nature of quantum mechanical systems or to provide examples of
paradigmatic thinking in quantum mechanics. The latter seems to be the predominant consideration.
The first example concerns an electron of which all that is known is that it
would be found on measurement somewhere in the interval (q, q + dq). Heisenberg
represents such an electron by a probability amplitude (or wave) S(q), which, by
the Born-Pauli statistical rules of interpretation, gives the probability distribution
|S(q)|2 dq
for finding the electron in the position interval (q, q+dq). Heisenberg calls
the standard deviation of the distribution Δq, the “position uncertainty of the
electron.” The probability amplitude S(q) can be converted into the probability
amplitude T(p) for the momentum p by the appropriate quantum mechanical
transformation rule. T(p) yields the probability distribution
|T(p)|2 dp
for finding the momentum in the interval (p, p + dp). Heisenberg calls the standard deviation of the distribution Δp, the “momentum uncertainty of the electron.”
Choosing a probability amplitude so as to give a Gaussian wave packet for q (and
consequently for p), Heisenberg proves that
Δq. Δp > h/2л(1)
This relation he interprets as the “direct intuitive content” of the commutation
relation
pq – qp = h/2лi

4

Ibid.
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The mathematical symbols p and q are the matrices (or in Dirac’s theory q-numbers) which, according to the rules for “quantizing” a physical problem, replace the
classical variables p and q, in the quantum mechanical description.
Δq and Δp, however, are statistical parameters for an ensemble of identically
prepared particles and to the extent that intuitive classical notions are called upon,
there is no logical reason, as Margenau, Jammer, and others have pointed out,
why the commutation relation (1) should impose a limitation on the simultaneous measurability of q and p for an individual particle.5 The statistical argument
just given does not support the conclusion that simultaneous measurability of q
and p in individual cases is subject to an Uncertainty Relation. For Heisenberg,
however, the Uncertainty Relations state a restriction on the simultaneous measurability of q and p for an individual atomic system. Since this conclusion cannot be
derived from the example, it is reasonable to suppose that Heisenberg introduced
the example for the purposes of the paradigm alone.
The proof of the Uncertainty Relations for individual cases requires the use of
more abstract principles. The proof (only implicit in these papers) follows from an
application of the principle of E-observability to the transformation theory outlined in the Drei Männer Arbeit.6 There it is shown that non-commuting matrices
cannot be simultaneously diagonalized. Now diagonalizing a matrix displays the
set of states in which the physical quantity takes a definite value in a realizable
physical environment—that is, it represents the spectrum of observable values
of the physical quantity and names the corresponding states of the system. The
mathematical fact that non-commuting matrices cannot be simultaneously diagonalized, implies that there is no situation of object-plus-physical environment
in which a definite value of one physical quantity co-exists with a definite value
of a non-commuting quantity (“non-commuting” referring to the representative
matrix operations). Basic to this inference, is the principle of observability that

5

6

H. Margenau, “Measurements and Quantum States,” Philos. Sci., 30 (1963): 1–16, 138–57;
M. Jammer, CDQP, 330; P. Feyerabend, “Problems of Microphysics,” in Frontiers of Science
and Philosophy, ed. by R. G. Colodny (London: Allen and Unwin, 1964), 206, 208–17.
K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959), chap. ix. Note
that if q and p are not simultaneously measurable, then q and p are not derived from one
ensemble of data, but from two ensembles—one from which Δq is derived, and the other
from which Δp is derived.
A reminder here of E. Husserl’s critique of modern science in The Crisis of European
Philosophy and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. by D. Carr (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1970); due to the loss of philosophical meaning, nature is reduced to a
mathematical model.
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restricts what can be observed and what, consequently, belongs to the real order
within the legitimate interpretation of the mathematical model.7
How the Uncertainty Relations affect individual phenomena is dealt with
intuitively in a series of examples. For example, Heisenberg considers the limitations imposed by the quantum of action on the ability of an X-ray microscope to
localize a particle.8 The example is worked out in a perfectly classical framework,
the atomic system being treated as a classical point particle which interacts during
the measurement process with a photon. The example satisfies the need for an
intuitive explanation of how and why, within the classical framework, the classical quantities of position and momentum cannot be simultaneously measured.
Whether the descriptive variables of the atomic system have (or should be taken to
have) a specific quantum theoretic and non-classical meaning is not part of these
considerations.
In another example, he treats the diffraction of an electron from a grating.9
He visualizes the electron as a wave packet occupying a certain volume wider than
the spacing of the grating. The spread-out wave packet reflects ignorance of the
whereabouts of the electron. More accurate knowledge of the localization of the
electron results in a smaller wave packet and less diffraction. Here the paradigm
exposition seems to suppose that ignorance of where the electron is positioned
within an interval (q + Δq) implies a wave function of width Δq and moreover,
that diffraction will occur if Δq is larger than the spacing of the diffraction grating.
I now turn to the criticism of this argument. In the first place, while it is true
for a quantum system that a wave packet of width Δq implies relative ignorance of
its position (this implies knowledge merely of the fact that it falls within the interval (q, q + Δq)), the converse does not follow. Secondly, ignorance of the precise
position of a particle within the interval (q, q + Δq) does not imply it has a wave
function, for it could be a classical particle which is not subject to diffraction.

7

8

9

For a consideration of the role of models in physics, see E. McMullin “What do Physical
Models tell Us?” in Logic; Methodology and Philosophy of Science III, ed. by B. van Rootselaar
and J. F. Staal (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1968), 385–96, as well as the references given
there to Achinstein, Black, Hesse, and Suppes.
Bohr pointed out that in Heisenberg’s treatment of the X-ray microscope, there was a
serious oversight—he had not taken into account the diameter of the microscope objective
lens. Cf. AHQP, Heisenberg-Kuhn, 25 February 1963. Also Jammer CDQM, op. cit, 329.
Heisenberg distinguishes between the Schrödinger wave function, which is a function in
3n-dimensional abstract space (for a system of n particles) and the wave-packet in what was
soon to be called the “complementary wave picture.” The latter was the de Broglie wavepacket visualized in the paradigm as a wave-packet in 3-dimensional classical space, but
nevertheless not objectified as an element of the real world.

52

|

the obser vab le

The argument from ignorance, then, presupposes a great deal that is not explicitly stated: it presupposes that the atomic system is a quantum theoretic object
and, therefore, that it possesses a wave function and that its wave function has
a known width Δq centered on the expectation value of q. The latter point is an
inference derived from the quantum mechanical equation of motion and from the
known objective conditions under which the system was prepared. From these,
the theoretical solution can be found and an a priori estimate derived of what
can be known. A priori limitations on what can be known (an objective uncertainty) need not correspond, however, with the a posteriori limitations on what is
actually known (a subjective uncertainty). What Heisenberg meant to affirm is an
objective uncertainty, that is, a limitation on what can be known. This uncertainty
provides an upper limit to what is actually known in any case. It is a theoretical
limit that underlies all practical and subjective limits and prepares the ground for a
re-definition of the meaning of the term “position,” in which the theoretical limit
is incorporated in a new meaning as a constitutive element of that meaning. In the
new meaning, a continuous trajectory cannot even be defined, since for a continuous trajectory, position and momentum must simultaneously have precise values
at every moment. What Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle shows is that, in the
new meaning of the kinematical terms, quantum mechanical systems do not follow
continuous trajectories, for the notion of trajectory is not definable in LQ.
In the course of the paper, the two main themes are reiterated: that the new
variables are relative to a measuring environment, and that the relation is based
upon a measurement interaction with the environment.10
Bohr was critical of the paper in which the Uncertainty Principle was
announced. He did not believe that new kinematical concepts were required for
quantum physics, and in the course of the following months, he succeeded in
bringing Heisenberg around to his view.

10

See Jammer’s discussion in CDQM, sect. 7.1.

